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Abstract: Exploitation of plastic money coupled with electronic banking services has come as expediency to 
financial establishment customers in Zimbabwe. This paper sought to analyze plastic money and electronic 
banking services espousal vis-a-viz financial identity theft fraud risk awareness in Zimbabwe banking sector 
via banks’ websites. The theoretical underpinning for this study is Routine Activity Theory. The study used 
qualitative content analysis research technique for examination of the text content data through the 
consistent taxonomy process of coding and classifying themes or patterns to submit a painstaking 
considerate of financial identity theft fraud awareness by the banking sector in Zimbabwe. A sample size of 
14 banks (including commercial, merchant and building societies) was used and the banks were arbitrarily 
chosen on the basis of website accessibility and ease of use of the data. The study findings suggest that there 
is very little financial identity theft awareness in Zimbabwe by the banking sector through their websites to 
the general public whilst there is amplified adoption of plastic money and electronic banking adoption. This 
study proposes a need to amplify the information and inform plastic card and electronic banking customers 
of the types of financial identity theft fraud. Plastic card and electronic banking is an urgent area to focus on 
for banking institutions and should inexorably capitalize in it. Financial identity theft information should be 
easily retrievable and conveyed in a manner that makes reasonableness to the varied customers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Financial liberalization and technology insurgency have endorsed the expansion of new-fangled and extra 
proficient release and dispensation means as well as more novel products and services in banking sector. 
Exploitation of plastic money coupled with electronic banking services has come as expediency to financial 
establishment customers. Plastic money1 and electronic banking services have become a workable preference 
for financial service providers and customers interface. Plastic cards and electronic banking innovations have 
productively become an indispensable part of the up-to-the-minute transaction system, providing a wide 
array of services to the customers, and have achieved much recognition at global level and have considerably 
grown over the years (Pudaruth, Juwaheer & Madoo, 2013). However, the archetypal crime of the information 
epoch is identity theft2, which refers to the malicious use of personal identifying data (Kahn & Roberds, 2008) 
or can be defined as the deliberate transfer, possession, or usage of any name or number that spots another 
person, with the target of perpetrating or assist a crime (Kahn & Liñares-Zegarra, 2013; Elbirt, 2005; Irfana & 
Raghurama, 2013). It is a type of impersonation that facilitates someone to perpetrate fraud and normally 
results in financial damage to the individual and financial gain to the impersonator (Radin, 2007). More so, 
financial identity theft involves the withdrawal of money by identity thief using personal information of a 
victim from his or her bank account and generally the victim is unaware that their identity has been stolen 
(Perl, 2003).  This form of criminology is made feasible by the aforementioned contemporary payment 
systems where merchants are willing to tender goods and services to aliens in exchange for a guarantee to 
pay, provided the undertake is supported by data that tie the buyer to a particular account or credit history 
(Anderson, Durbin, & Salinger, 2008). 
 
In other developed and emerging countries such as America and South Africa financial identity theft is the top 
growing crime, happening when the criminal gains confidential information from an individual or business 
                                                          
1Plastic money refers to the make use of credit or debit cards as a substitute for cash for goods and services payments.  
2 Identity theft, also known as identity fraud, happens when an individual's personally identifying information is used without permission and/or 
knowledge by someone else (often a stranger) (Radin, 2007). 
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and utilizes it to get right of entry into private financial accounts (Brody, Mulig & Kimball, 2007; Farina, 2015; 
Sanchez, 2012; Kahn & Liñares-Zegarra, 2013). Owing to the incessant technological progression and the 
nearly omnipresent use of electronic gadgets and the internet, financial identity theft is a crime that can take 
place virtually anywhere (Farina, 2015). This dawn of the information age has fashioned fresh challenges to 
the capability of individuals to guard the solitude and security of their personal information (Saunders & 
Zucker, 1999). Identity theft has become one of the most money-spinning criminal events eased by the 
capacious information obtainable on the internet and the reported episodes of identity theft have increased at 
an unmatched tempo (Elbirt, 2005; Aïmeur, & Schonfeld, 2011; Perl, 2003). Most customers are ignorant of 
the amount of data they divulge over the internet services proposed by search engines, social networking 
sites, e-commerce web sites and free online tools (Aïmeur, & Schonfeld, 2011). The increase of online services 
in which customers are confirmed by a username and password, is ever more browbeaten by identity theft 
actions (Moskovitch, Feher, Messerman, Kirschnick, Mustafić, Camtepe, & Elovici, 2009). Financial Identity 
theft fraud is a problem heart-rending the whole society and often is an entryway crime, in which stolen or 
fraudulent identities are used to steal money, claim eligibility for services, hack into networks without 
permission (Nokhbeh, Manoharan, Yang,  & Barber, 2017). 
 
Another titanic cost of financial identity theft, to businesses is the loss of customer confidence and therefore 
creating awareness is one of the most imperative outfits in fighting identity theft (Brody, Mulig, & Kimball, 
2007). In addition financial institutions and consumers have to work in partnership to thwart further 
incidences. With sophisticated technology and unrelenting educational outreach by businesses, financial 
institutions and educational organizations, there will be a decrease in the level of identity theft taking place 
(Brody, Mulig & Kimball, 2007). As financial institutions progressively more offer online or electronic banking 
services and plastic card transactions to their customers, they must face issues of consumer trust in electronic 
service. If financial institutions, in cooperation with their customers, make it safe to adopt plastic and 
electronic services consequently, building the best controls to prevent fraud and protect customers is of 
significant magnitude (Irfana & Raghurama, 2013). There is extensive conformity that financial identity theft 
fraud causes financial smash up to consumers, lending institutions, retail establishments, and the economy at 
large (Hoofnagle, 2007).  
 
Developing countries societies frequently experience derisory level of literacy when using electronic banking 
systems and it is apparent that except the financial organizations take all the indispensable and realistic steps 
to educate its clients, they stand a risk of paying robust indemnities for the loss of money online through 
identity theft (Granova & Eloff, 2004). Unpredictably, there is petite first-rate public information presented 
about the extent of the crime and the genuine damages it causes. Zimbabwe has not been an exception to the 
adoption of these innovations and the adoption has been driven by the recent liquidity challenges. The 
principal financial regulator, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe have strongly encouraged espousal of plastic money 
(credit cards, debit card, visa card etc) and electronic innovations (Electronic Funds Transfer Systems (EFTs), 
mobile banking, personal computer, banking and internet banking). The usage of plastic cards and electronic 
transactions in Zimbabwe by customers and merchants has just dramatically increased. Nevertheless, 
adoption of plastic money and electronic innovations in Zimbabwe has not been related to the awareness and 
education on financial identity fraud security. It is therefore imperative for the financial institutions in 
Zimbabwe to give financial identity theft fraud awareness information to the general populace through 
disclosure on the websites. Against this backdrop this paper seeks to analyze plastic money and electronic 
banking services espousal vis-a-viz financial identity theft fraud risk awareness in Zimbabwe banking sector 
via banks’ websites. The following sections of the paper covers contribution of the study, theoretical 
framework, empirical and literature review, methodology, findings and discussions, conclusion and 
implications. 
 
Contribution of the study: This study makes a valuable contribution given the fact that qualitative empirical 
studies and literature on plastic money and electronic banking services adoption in relation to financial 
identity theft fraud risk awareness in the context of Zimbabwe as a developing nation are relatively very rare. 
Consequently, it would serve as a roadmap for banking institutions, regulators, policy makers and financial 
consumers to design strategies to better promote financial identity theft fraud risk awareness in Zimbabwe. 
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Theoretical Framework: The theoretical underpinning for this study is Routine Activity Theory which was 
coined by Cohen and Felson (1979). Crime is considered to be the corollary of the incidence of a stimulated 
offender, the presence of a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian (Hutchings and Hayes, 
2009). Cohen and Felson (1979) suggested that there is an increased probability of victimization when 
individuals are positioned in high risk locations, are attractive targets, lack of a capable guardian and are in 
the reach of a motivated offender. Routine activity theory is traditionally drawn upon to underscore the role 
of offender motivation, target suitability, and effective guardianship in explaining victimization patterns 
(Drawve, Thomas & Walker 2014). Even though the routine activity approach was formerly written to 
account for direct-contact offenses, it seems that the viewpoint also has utility in elucidating crimes at a 
distance (Reyns, 2013). 
 
Routine activity theory has been used to explicate cybercrime at individual level, but not at national level 
(Kigerl, 2012). According to Hutchings and Hayes (2009)’s findings indicate that potential victims who take 
on high levels of routine activities relating to computer and internet banking use are more probable to be 
attacked by motivated offenders. More so, Reyns (2013)’s results suggest that individuals who use the 
internet for banking are fairly more likely to be victims of identity theft than others. Correspondingly, online 
shopping and downloading behaviours augmented victimization risk. Reyns, Henson & Fisher (2011) found 
that specifically, antecedents measuring online exposure to risk, online immediacy to motivated offenders, 
online guardianship, online target charisma, and online deviance were noteworthy predictors of cyber 
aggravation victimization. However, Leukfeldt (2014) concluded that personal background and financial 
characteristics play no role in phishing victimization and only "targeted browsing" led to amplified risk. As for 
ease of access, using trendy operating systems and web browsers does not guide to superior risk, while 
having the latest antivirus software as a technically proficient guardian has no effect. The results showed no 
one has an augmented likelihood of becoming a victim. Consequently, banks could play the role of capable 
guardianship. There is therefore a need to pick identity theft earlier as Albrecht; Albrecht & Tzafrir (2011) 
found that if identity theft is detected before time, consumers can guard themselves from the immense and 
tricky costs of identity theft. Paek & Nalla (2015) in Korea their results propose that education level, routine 
online activities and fright of identity theft victimization are positively associated with identity theft 
persecution. Concurring to the above it was found that certain routine activities openly influence the 
possibility of encountering identity theft (Reyns & Henson, 2015).  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
In this modern world of information technology, many fraudsters prey on their fatalities via the internet 
given the level of revelation of personal information in many of current information age transactions. Two of 
the most frequent traditions that thieves obtain personal information to aid them in identity theft are 
phishing3 and pharming (Brody, Mulig, & Kimball, 2007). Phishing employs mass e-mail messages to charm 
recipients into divulging personal information. The emails assert to be from one’s bank or other organizations 
but are in fact would have been sent by fraudsters (Brody, Mulig, & Kimball, 2007; Irfana & Raghurama, 
2013). These e-mails classically contain a link that takes the recipient to a phony website indistinguishable to 
the original website and one is asked to verify or update personal information. The personal information is 
taken by the fraudster who would use the information to access online bank account (Irfana & Raghurama, 
2013). It is also known as web spoofing which involves fraudulent email and web sites that swindle gullible 
users into disclosing confidential information (Chou, Ledesma, Teraguchi & Mitchell, 2004). Phishing is a 
form of social engineering based on technical exploits (for instance, password sniffers intercepting encrypted 
passwords and key loggers capturing the victim’s keystrokes) or a blend of both technology and social 
engineering (Hutchings and Hayes, 2009). 
 
                                                          
3 The word “phishing” comes from an analogy to fishing; the email is bait used to lure in “fish” from the “sea” of internet users. 
The “f” is changed to “ph” in keeping with computer hacking tradition (Lynch 2005:259) 
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Social engineering practices (Spear Phishing, Pharming and Smishing) are most habitually used where 
perpetrators fake as legitimate companies appealing for personal details targeting profiled groups based on 
needs for goods and services, getting better their success; bypass social engineering, as a substitute targeting 
software ensuing in the automatic redirection to illegitimate mock websites; and use SMS text messages to 
aim mobile internet users (Williams, 2015). In a similar scheme Vishing involves a person calls pretending to 
be a bank representative seeking to verify account information (Irfana & Raghurama, 2013). Pharmers, on the 
other hand, shed a broad net for the credulous (Brody, Mulig, & Kimball, 2007). Pharming is the installation of 
malicious code on one’s computer without any acknowledgement or an e-mail attachment that installs 
malicious code on a computer which leads to a fake website insecurely resembling bank’s website and 
without knowledge one provide financial identity details (Irfana & Raghurama, 2013). Moreover, electronic 
banking credentials can also be gained by malware that is fixed on computers without users’ knowledge, 
normally by clicking on a link allied to fouled software in an unsolicited email (Williams, 2015). Malware has 
been intended to log users’ keystrokes, insert fake web pages (browser in the middle attack) and execute 
illicit actions on computers, in an endeavour to capture passwords and personal banking information 
(Williams, 2015). Malware includes keyloggers and spyware. Spyware is installed on a victim’s computer and 
with the use of a keylogger permits a fraudster to not only spy on what websites are visited, but also record 
what keys are hard-pressed such as online banking passwords (NSW Justice, 2011). 
 
On the other hand, plastic card fraud is defined as using plastic payment cards, such as ATM, debit, credit or 
store cards to withdraw money without permission or prior knowledge from a financial institution (NSW 
Justice, 2011). Plastic card fraud frequently happens via the illegitimate gaining and/or use of card 
information and the personal identification number (NSW Justice, 2011). In most cases cards used to commit 
fraud are usually lost or stolen cards which could be used intact or changed by re-embossing and re-encoding, 
or forged cards that are completely new (Smith & Grabosky, 1998). To counterfeit a card it is essential to 
know the details of an existing legitimate cardholder consequently the craving of reprobate to acquire rightful 
plastic card details from other sources such as the internet (Smith & Grabosky, 1998). Occasionally 
information on the card's magnetic strip is obtained through "card skimming". This is when a genuine card is 
obtained for a few seconds to facilitate it to be passed over a magnetic tape reader so that a phoney copy may 
be made (Smith & Grabosky, 1998). Another technique is "buffering", which entails transforming the 
information kept in the magnetic strip of the card or gaining security codes electronically (Smith & Grabosky, 
1998). Nonetheless, according to Pudaruth, Juwaheer & Madoo (2013) in their analysis they revealed that 
customers have acknowledged plastic cards as a helpful means of effecting payments since plastic cards 
proffers worldwide acceptance. Even though plastic cards are valuable, Sakharova & Khan (2011) found that 
payment card fraud is causing billions of dollars in losses for the card payment industry and the brand name 
can be affected by loss of consumer buoyancy due to the fraud. This requires the supply of awareness 
information as Vincent (2005) concluded that provision of information about credit card functioning in India 
and payment settlement is a good thing to both the merchants and customers. In the same vein Kaseke (2012) 
found that individual factors such as education level had a bearing on the use of plastic money. In support to 
that Archer (2012) implicated that consumer education on identity theft fraud leads to pressure that 
consumers need to utilize all behaviours that can reduce risk and loss. 
 
Irfana & Raghurama (2013) concluded that many individuals or organizations are not observant enough and 
do not take proper safety measures whilst online. Subsequently, this directs to fraudsters detaining their 
personal information and performing all types of fraudulent transactions on the internet. For this reason, 
users of e-banking should make sure that they follow protected principles when giving away or accessing 
sensitive information. Moir & Weir, (2009) specifically found that a predominantly high occurrence of agents 
who had before dealt with phone calls that they measured doubtful. Moreover, there were agents within such 
surroundings who had previously been presented money in exchange for customers' details, or who know of 
beneficiary workers who received such offers. Ultimately, they found that specific practices within contact 
centres may add to the probability of identity theft. All in all, Milne (2003) concluded that identity theft is a 
severe and progressively more ubiquitous crime, and consumers need to take precautionary measures to 
lessen the chance of becoming a victim and that consumer education appears to be satisfactory for several 
identify theft preventative behaviours.  Steyn, Kruger & Drevin (2007) found that educational and awareness 
activities pertaining to email environments are of utmost significance to manage the amplified risks of 
identity theft. Dzomira (2016) found that internet fraud awareness to the general public via website is 
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stumpy by many Southern African banks. Even though some banks have internet fraud information on 
internet banking applications, however, the bona fide usefulness of this information is timid. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The study used qualitative content analysis research technique for examination of the text content data 
through the consistent taxonomy process of coding and classifying themes or patterns Du-Plooy-Cilliers, 
Davis, & Bezuidenhout (2014) to submit a painstaking considerate of financial identity theft fraud awareness 
by the banking sector in Zimbabwe in the wake of espousal of plastic money and electronic services. A sample 
size of 14 banks (including commercial, merchant and building societies) was used and the banks were 
arbitrarily chosen on the basis of website accessibility and ease of use of the data. The sample size was 
premeditated considering the exactitude of how closely the sample value relates to the population value of 19 
banks (commercial, building societies, merchant and savings bank) and suggested ‘equal precision’ of 10% 
(Brink et al., 2013) and, in this study, 74% (14 banks) of the total population was used as the sample size. 
Information on plastic money and electronic services banking fraud awareness was retrieved from each 
bank’s website in the sample size. QDA Miner a qualitative data and text analysis software package was used 
for coding textual data and annotating, retrieving and reviewing coded data and documents. Coding sequence 
was done on the salvaged libretto marking sections of data. The descriptive statistical analysis was done 
using frequencies, cluster analysis, similarity matrices, and crosstab matrix.  
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
 
Adoption of Plastic Cards and Electronic Banking: The table below shows the espousal of plastic cards and 
electronic banking by the 11 banks constituting the sample size. The scoring of the variables was basically 
dichotomous, where a variable scores 1 if adopted and 0 if it is not. The results suggest that all the 11 banks 
(100%) have adopted the use of plastic cards and electronic banking services in Zimbabwe.  
 
Table 1: Adoption of Plastic Cards and Electronic Banking 
Bank Plastic Card Adoption Electronic Banking Adoption 
 Score  % Score  % 
Bank 2 1.00 100% 1.00 100% 
Bank 3 1.00 100% 1.00 100% 
Bank 4 1.00 100% 1.00 100% 
Bank 5 1.00 100% 1.00 100% 
Bank 6 1.00 100% 1.00 100% 
Bank 7 1.00 100% 1.00 100% 
Bank 8 1.00 100% 1.00 100% 
Bank 10 1.00 100% 1.00 100% 
Bank 11 1.00 100% 1.00 100% 
Bank 13 1.00 100% 1.00 100% 
Bank 14 1.00 100% 1.00 100% 
Total  11 100% 11 100% 
 
Financial Identity Theft Fraud Risk Awareness Coding frequencies: Coding frequencies from Table 1 
below constitute the list of all codes in the codebook along with their category to which they belong. It was 
found that phishing/pharming has the highest count of 7 (26.90%) in 7 (50%) cases. This shows that only 
seven banks out of 14 banks have disclosed phishing/pharming awareness on their websites to the general 
public. Malware and vishing have 3 counts (11.5%) each and from 3 cases (21.4%) each followed by 
hacking/cracking, key-logging, and lost/stolen card with 2 counts (7.7%) each from 2 cases (14.3%) each and 
lastly skimming, smshing, social engineering, swim swap fraud, card cloning, 419 scam and ATM card fraud 
with 1 count (3.8%) each from 1 case (7.1%) each. These results suggest that the bulk of the banks in the 
sample size have no disclosure of all the identified financial identity theft fraud types hence all the banks in 
the sample size have adopted plastic card and electronic banking services. This also suggests that the banks 
need to increase the awareness of financial identity theft risk as this would adversely affect the full 
implementation of plastic money and electronic banking services.  The results concur with Kahn & Liares-
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Zegarra (2016)’s findings that certain forms of identity theft episodes affect positively the probability of 
espousing credit cards, stored value cards, bank account number payments and online banking bill payments. 
More so, Geeta (2011)’s findings suggest that there has been an augment in identity theft in the last few years 
which could pose a grave quandary in the future, resulting in loss of confidence by the customer towards 
internet banking. 
 
Coding co-occurrence similarity: The co-occurrence similarity index shown in Table 2 below allows the 
selection of the similarity measure used in clustering. Ochiai’s coefficient measures the mere occurrences of 
specific codes in a case without considering their frequency. Ochiai’s coefficient index is the binary form of 
the cosine measure which is represented by SQRT (a^2/((a+b)(a+c))), where a represents cases where both 
items occur, and b and c represent cases, where one item is present but not the other one. From Table 2 
below 419 scam and ATM fraud; ATM card fraud and card cloning; 419 scam and skimming; ATM card fraud 
and skimming; and card cloning and skimming have a coefficient of 1 each indicating that they occur more 
often.  Vishing and key-logging have the second highest coefficient of 0.816 followed by swim swap fraud and 
hacking/cracking with a coefficient of 0.707. From the results there is an indication that the bulk of the 
combinations have a nil coefficient reflecting that the disclosure is very low. 
 
Table 2: Coding frequencies 
Category Code Count % Codes Cases % Cases 
Financial Identity Theft Fraud Phishing/Pharming 7 26.90% 7 50.00% 
Financial Identity Theft Fraud Malware 3 11.50% 3 21.40% 
Financial Identity Theft Fraud Skimming 1 3.80% 1 7.10% 
Financial Identity Theft Fraud Smshing 1 3.80% 1 7.10% 
Financial Identity Theft Fraud Vishing 3 11.50% 3 21.40% 
Financial Identity Theft Fraud Hacking/Cracking 2 7.70% 2 14.30% 
Financial Identity Theft Fraud Key logging 2 7.70% 2 14.30% 
Financial Identity Theft Fraud Social Engineering 1 3.80% 1 7.10% 
Financial Identity Theft Fraud Lost/Stolen Card 2 7.70% 2 14.30% 
Financial Identity Theft Fraud SIM swap fraud 1 3.80% 1 7.10% 
Financial Identity Theft Fraud Card cloning 1 3.80% 1 7.10% 
Financial Identity Theft Fraud 419 Scam 1 3.80% 1 7.10% 
Financial Identity Theft Fraud ATM card fraud 1 3.80% 1 7.10% 
 
Table 3: Coding co-occurrence similarity 
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419 Scam 1                         
ATM card  
Fraud 
1 1                       
Card  
cloning 
1 1 1                     
Hacking/ 
Cracking 
0 0 0 1                   
Key- 
logging 
0 0 0 0.5 1                 
Lost/ 
Stolen Card 
0 0 0 0 0 1               
Malware 0 0 0 0.408 0.408 0 1             
Phishing/ 
Pharming 
0 0 0 0.535 0.535 0 0.436 1           
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SIM swap 
 fraud 
0 0 0 0.707 0 0 0.577 0.378 1         
Skimming 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1       
Smshing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.378 0 0 1     
Social Engineering 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.378 0 0 0 1   
Vishing 0 0 0 0.408 0.816 0 0.333 0.655 0 0 0.577 0 1 
 
Case similarity matrix: Table 3 above shows clustering performed on banks; the matrix used for clustering 
consists of cosine coefficients computed on the relative frequency of the various financial identity theft fraud 
types’ awareness. The more corresponding two cases will be in terms of the share of codes the higher will be 
the coefficient. Comparisons were based on which codes appear in each case, without taking into account the 
number of times each code appears. From the results Bank 7 and Bank 10; and Bank 8 and Bank 11 clusters 
have highest coefficient of 1 each. This means that the corresponding banks have similar financial identity 
theft fraud disclosures. Bank 6 and Bank 8; and Bank 6 and Bank 11 clusters follow with a coefficient of 0.84 
each and the least coefficient is 0.28 belonging to Bank 13 and Bank 14 cluster; Bank 4 and Bank 14 cluster, 
and Bank 3 and Bank 14 cluster. 
 
Table 4: Case similarity matrix 
 
Bank 
2 
Bank 
3 
Bank 
4 
Bank 
5 
Bank 
6 
Bank 
7 
Bank 
8 
Bank 
10 
Bank 
11 
Bank 
13 
Bank 
14 
Bank 2 1                     
Bank 3 0.72 1                   
Bank 4 0.4 0.82 1                 
Bank 5 0.42 0.71 0.71 1               
Bank 6 0.44 0.59 0.59 0.64 1             
Bank 7 0.46 0.4 0.4 0.42 0.44 1           
Bank 8 0.46 0.72 0.72 0.76 0.84 0.46 1         
Bank 10 0.46 0.4 0.4 0.42 0.44 1 0.46 1       
Bank 11 0.46 0.72 0.72 0.76 0.84 0.46 1 0.46 1     
Bank 13 0.72 0.64 0.64 0.52 0.59 0.4 0.72 0.4 0.72 1   
Bank 14 0.4 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.36 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.28 1 
 
Cross tabulation matrix: The dialog box, Table 4 above explores the correlation between financial identity 
theft fraud awareness and banks in Zimbabwe as defined by values of categorical variable. The dialog box 
counts the total number of times financial identity theft fraud awareness has been unveiled by each bank 
making the sample size. The top most exhibits are shown by Banks 14; 13; 4 and 3 with 4 counts each of the 
financial identity theft fraud types out of 12 types. Bank 5 has 3 counts only whilst Bank 6 has 2 counts and 
the rest have 1 count each. The results propose that there is very low disclosure of financial identity theft 
fraud by banks in Zimbabwe whilst all the banks comprising the sample size have adopted plastic money and 
electronic banking services for their customers. The banks are not adequately providing financial identity 
theft awareness to the general public on their websites. 
 
Table 5: Cross tabulation matrix 
  
Bank 
2 
Bank 
3 
Bank 
4 
Bank 
5 
Bank 
6 
Bank 
7 
Bank 
8 
Bank 
10 
Bank 
11 
Bank 
13 
Bank 
14 
Pear- 
son's 
R 
P 
value 
Phishing/ 
Pharming 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
-
0.138 0.342 
Malware 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
-
0.246 0.233 
Skimming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.531 0.047 
Smishing 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-
0.209 0.268 
Vishing 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-
0.564 0.035 
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Hacking/ 
Cracking 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.117 0.366 
Key- 
logging 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-
0.496 0.06 
Social  
Engineeri
ng 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-
0.127 0.355 
Lost/ 
Stolen 
Card 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0.117 0.366 
SIM swap  
fraud 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.448 0.083 
Card  
cloning 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.531 0.047 
419 Scam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.531 0.047 
ATM card  
fraud 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.531 0.047 
Total  1 4 4 3 2 1 1 1 1 4 4 
   
Generally, the study’s results are supported by other scholars’ findings and conclusions. Vincent (2005)’s 
study conclusion that provision of information about credit card functioning in India and payment settlement 
is a good thing to both the merchants and customers. Also the results correspond with Kaseke (2012)’s 
findings that individual factors such as education level had a bearing on the use of plastic money and that a 
number of problems were encountered by consumers in relative to security. Archer (2012)’s findings 
correspond with this study’s results. The results implicated that consumer education and awareness on 
identity theft and fraud leads to pressure that consumers need to utilize all behaviours that can reduce risk 
and loss. Moreover, the findings support Milne (2003)’s conclusion that consumer education appears to be 
satisfactory for several identify theft preventative behaviours.  The findings concur with Steyn, Kruger & 
Drevin (2007) who found that educational and awareness activities pertaining to email environments are of 
utmost significance to manage the amplified risks of identity theft. As well, Dzomira (2016) found that 
internet fraud awareness to the general public via website is stumpy by many Southern African banks. Even 
though some banks have internet fraud information on internet banking applications, however, the bona fide 
usefulness of this information is timid. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
It is therefore concluded that there is very little financial identity theft awareness in Zimbabwe by the 
banking sector through their websites to the general public against an amplified adoption of plastic money 
and electronic banking services. This study proposes a need to amplify financial identity theft awareness 
information and enlighten plastic card and electronic banking customers of the types of financial identity 
theft fraud they are likely to encounter. Plastic card and electronic banking is an urgent area to focus on for 
banking institutions and should inexorably capitalize in it. Financial identity theft information should be 
easily retrievable and conveyed in a manner that makes reasonableness to the varied customers. Also, to curb 
financial identity theft risk linked with plastic card and electronic banking activities conducted both locally 
and externally, banks should make ample disclosure and consciousness of financial identity theft information 
on their web sites to the universal public and take apt measures to warranty adherence to financial customer 
privacy requirements relevant in the jurisdictions to which the bank is providing plastic card and electronic 
banking services. More so, it is concluded that Routine activity theory is incomparable among theories of 
criminology in that it seek out to expound changing plastic card and electronic banking fraud hounding risks 
among individuals and the accountability of illicit location in the episode of criminal events committed online. 
At the heart of routine activity theory is the thought that crimes can only grow when three fundamentals of a 
situation are in existence: plastic card and electronic fraudsters, plastic card and electronic users, and 
ineffectual financial guardians. When these three situational bare bones come together in place and time, the 
likelihood of plastic card and electronic banking fraud event happening is significantly amplified 
predominantly in the deficiency of awareness. 
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Study Implications: This study affords a profound understanding on financial identity theft awareness factor 
impacting on plastic card and electronic services embracing. This study proposes a policy by banking 
regulators or overseers in Zimbabwe for increasing the financial identity theft fraud awareness information 
and informs financial customers of plastic card and electronic fraud committed by fraudsters. The 
information must be out in the open to the general public on the website of each banking institution not only 
to offer such information, when a customer has logged in on the internet application to transact. This would 
make plastic card and electronic banking fraud material readily retrievable. Moreover, banking regulators in 
Zimbabwe must pass regulations that make banking institutions to take apt measures to ensure adherence to 
customer privacy requirements applicable in the country. The banking regulators also should make policies 
towards the prioritization of financial identity theft fraud risk by banks on their risk registers. That is the 
banking institutions, therefore, should prioritize financial identity theft fraud risk aspects on banking 
institution’s risk register so as to stand competitive advantage in the contemporary technologically 
sophisticated epoch. 
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